There are moments when topics that have long been on the periphery suddenly become the focus of a debate. The 11th meeting of the Saxony Innovation Advisory Board on March 22, 2026 in Dresden was just such a moment. Under the new chairwoman Veronika Grimm, the agenda not only included the usual mix of transformation paths, innovation policy and location issues, but also very explicitly the question of what role microelectronics should play in security, defense capability and crisis resilience – and thus very specifically what responsibility a location like Saxony assumes in this mixed situation. Since this meeting at the latest, it has become clear that anyone talking about Saxony’s future viability can no longer avoid the topic of defense.
Parallel to this, reports are piling up that underline this shift. GlobalFoundries is expanding its Dresden capacities with SPRINT for 1.1 billion euros and now openly names the defense industry as a strategic customer. X-FAB is positioning itself as a reliable European foundry for radiation-hard components in defense and aerospace applications. Hensoldt concludes a long-term supply contract with UMS and reports on it publicly.
And with the “Declaration: Semiconductors – Key to Security and Defense Capabilities”, Silicon Saxony itself has presented a paper that no longer describes semiconductors merely as an “enabler” of prosperity, but explicitly as the basis of security and defense policy capabilities. The topic has even appeared at the Munich Security Conference under headings such as “Silicon Statecraft”. You can lament this or start to think it through strategically.
Civilian volume, military strength
If you’re honest, you have to admit it: The connection between microelectronics and defense is less a question of sympathy than one of system logic. Modern weapon systems, from reconnaissance drones and radar systems to command and communication infrastructure, are now made more of silicon than steel. The proportion of electronic components has risen massively in recent years, and with it the dependence on complex, globally distributed supply chains. At the same time, military quantities alone do not support an independent semiconductor ecosystem. The volumes that keep fabs busy and justify investments are created in civilian markets – in the automotive industry, in industrial electronics, in energy and communication applications.
From a German and Saxon perspective in particular, this is not a disadvantage, but a lever. In all likelihood, we will not be manufacturing any globally dominant AI accelerators in the foreseeable future, but with automotive and industrial chips, power electronics and sensor technology, we have precisely those segments that are technologically demanding, in long-term demand and at the same time highly dual-use-capable. Civilian volumes are the prerequisite for ensuring that security and defense-related applications can be served cost-effectively and reliably. Anyone who believes that defense policy and semiconductor production can be clearly separated is misjudging the industrial reality: dual use is not a rhetorical figure, but a business and technological necessity.
Sovereignty is more than just a buzzword
Many papers now talk about “technological sovereignty”. The crucial question is: What does this mean in concrete terms for a country like Germany? Sovereignty does not mean mastering every technology in every depth. It means having enough control over critical parts of the value chain to remain capable of acting in the event of a crisis, i.e. not only being able to research, but also to produce, certify and integrate. In the case of semiconductors, this means having access to production capacities that cannot be lost overnight due to export controls, sanctions or geopolitical tensions.
This is precisely where the strategic opportunity lies for locations like Saxony. With the plants of GlobalFoundries, Infineon, X-FAB, Bosch and SAW Components and a dense environment of research institutions and design expertise – the Barkhausen Institute and Racyics should be explicitly mentioned here – the region has something that has to be painstakingly built up elsewhere in Europe: an industrial and scientific ecosystem that is available in relevant depth from design to production. When we talk about sovereignty, we are not talking about fantasies of self-sufficiency, but about using these existing strengths in such a way that they are more than just a footnote in global supply chains in an emergency.
Strong programs, weak integration
A lot has happened at the political level in recent years. The EU Chips Act, IPCEI AST, the national microelectronics strategy, research programs such as FITS 2030 or the HighTechAgenda, the European Defence Fund or the new data center and data strategies are all building blocks that would not have been thought possible just a few years ago. Viewed from a distance, the picture is quite impressive.
A closer look reveals fractures and gaps. The recent arms summit in Berlin showed that the defense industry and politicians are certainly willing to talk openly with each other. However, the semiconductor industry was not at the table. The Industrial Accelerator Act aims to strengthen Europe’s industry, but largely leaves out chips and AI. The national data center strategy is finally thinking big in terms of AI computing power and cloud infrastructure, but ignores the question of which silicon these data centers should run on in case of doubt. And a procurement logic based purely on COTS, or “Components Off The Shelf” components, remains convenient until a crisis breaks supply chains and it suddenly becomes clear that “off the shelf” only works as long as the store is open.
In short, the individual programs address many of the right points, but they are not yet designed to think of microelectronics, security and defence as a coherent system. From the perspective of a cluster like Silicon Saxony, this is less a cause for complaint than an indication of where the next step must lie.
What does this mean for Silicon Saxony?
For us as a network, the issue is neither over nor can it be delegated. The specific question is how we want to deal with this development. It is not only understandable that there are different attitudes in the community, but also necessary. Anyone who is concerned with defense does not have to have a desire for armaments. But they must recognize that security and defence policy issues can no longer be pushed to the sidelines when the underlying technologies come from our clean rooms.
Silicon Saxony brings a lot to this debate that needs to be built up elsewhere: an established manufacturing base, strong design and research players, international networking and a membership that is prepared to put up with uncomfortable topics and discuss them constructively. This is exactly what will be needed in the coming years: not reflexive defense or naive enthusiasm, but a sober, informed discussion about the role of microelectronics in security issues and how we want to shape this role responsibly.
How do you see this? Is the open discussion of defense issues a mandatory part of the self-image of a microelectronics cluster today? Or do you draw a red line elsewhere? What expectations do you have of Silicon Saxony when it comes to combining chips, security and sovereignty? I look forward to your feedback and suggestions. Precisely because the topic won’t get any easier if we don’t talk about it.
At this point, in addition to the aforementioned “Declaration: Semiconductors – Key to Security and Defense Capabilities“, I would also like to recommend our latest podcast episode, which you can listen to online and via the usual podcast platforms (Spotify, Deezer, Apple Podcast).
_ _ _ _ _
Further links
👉 Declaration: Semiconductors – Key to Security and Defense Capabilities
👉 Listen to the podcast “What’s Chippening” online
